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THREADING THE FIRST AMENDMENT NEEDLE: 
ANONYMOUS SPEECH, ONLINE HARASSMENT, AND 
WASHINGTON’S CYBERSTALKING STATUTE 
Sarah E. Smith* 
Abstract: This Comment examines the constitutionality of Washington’s cyberstalking 
statute, RCW 9.61.260, and its treatment of anonymous online speech. While the statute was 
drafted to ensure that women are free from domestic and gender-based violence, the statute 
as currently written and enforced infringes on the constitutionally protected right to free 
speech. There has only been one action, Moriwaki v. Rynearson,1 enforcing the provision of 
the statute related to anonymous speech. The court ultimately overturned the stalking 
protection order, which the plaintiff brought to halt political speech, on First Amendment 
grounds. While the Moriwaki court concluded that the stalking protection order there was an 
unconstitutional application of the law, RCW 9.61.260 is likely facially invalid under the 
First Amendment and incapable of withstanding strict scrutiny analysis. Faced with these 
issues, Washington has several options. Washington courts could narrowly construct 
RCW 9.61.260(1)(b). In so doing, courts could differentiate between anonymous speech that 
is ordinarily protected by the First Amendment and speech that is unprotected. The courts 
could also overturn the entire statute as unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. This 
Comment argues that the legislature should return to the drawing board and redraft 
RCW 9.61.260 so that it can pass muster under the First Amendment. This Comment also 
proposes model legislation on which the Washington legislature could base a new law. 
Regardless of what Washington decides to do, the importance of preventing violence against 
women and preserving free speech online are too great to sacrifice to sloppy legislative 
drafting. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine receiving constant unsettling messages via Twitter or 
Facebook: an ex-boyfriend threatens to post intimate photographs unless 
you agree to get back together.2 Imagine an acquaintance that bombards 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Washington School of Law. I would like to thank Professor 
Bob Gomulkiewicz for his insightful edits, comments, and mentorship throughout the drafting 
process. I would also like to thank the stellar editors at Washington Law Review. This piece would 
not be where it is without their efforts. As a matter of disclosure, I have previously interned with the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, a technology and civil liberties impact litigation organization, and 
Legal Voice, a women’s and LGBTQ rights impact litigation organization. All errors are my own.  
1. No. 17-2-01463-1, 2018 WL 733811 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2018). 
2. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 204 (2014) (detailing the 
experiences of a woman whose ex-boyfriend sent her family, coworkers, and business associates 
postcards featuring images of the woman in lingerie and links to websites that featured nude 
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your online accounts with threats due to some perceived slight.3 Imagine 
a coworker or neighbor with a grudge, pretending to be you and posting 
sexually explicit content under your name.4 Imagine some shadowy 
figure, seemingly dedicated to following your every move, on a website 
followed by hundreds of people you do not know, and suddenly the 
figure posts your home address, telling their followers to track you down 
and harm you.5 Most people would agree that the victims of these 
actions rightfully deserve an avenue to seek protection from their 
harassers. 
Now imagine that you are an activist, taking advantage of the 
anonymity of the internet to criticize a local politician. You run an 
anonymous Facebook account, creating memes and posts calling for the 
politician to more critically examine their views and actions. You 
occasionally use this account to send direct messages to the politician, 
and while you are critical of them, you never threaten them or their 
family, say anything lewd or obscene, or advocate that others commit 
criminal acts. And even if you did share things directly with the 
politician, the intent of your comments never went beyond what would 
be considered harmless “trolling.” Should this local politician be allowed 
to cry foul just because you were frequently communicating with them 
anonymously?6 Assuming that the comments never rose to the level of 
threats or obscenity, most of us would probably balk at the suggestion 
                                                     
photographs of her after she refused to resume their relationship); Margaret Talbot, The Attorney 
Fighting Revenge Porn, NEW YORKER (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/05/the-attorney-fighting-revenge-porn 
[https://perma.cc/Y3UF-7VCM] (detailing the experiences of Norma, a woman who took her ex-
boyfriend to court after he posted intimate photographs of her taken and shared during the 
relationship to an adult-themed website after they broke up). 
3. See, e.g., State v. Stanley, No. 74204–3–I, 2017 WL 3868480, at *1–3 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 
2017) (detailing the experiences of women who were sent messages threatening physical and sexual 
violence unless they responded to defendant’s messages). 
4. See, e.g., Scott Gutierrez, Former Assistant Attorney General Pleads Guilty to Harassment, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 4, 2009, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Former-assistant-attorney-general-pleads-guilty-
1305538.php [https://perma.cc/Q79P-Z5V3] (detailing conduct by an attorney who harassed his 
former neighbor on the telephone before finally posting her address and phone number online and 
stating that she was looking for sexual partners).  
5. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET 31 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (detailing the experience of a 
female computer programmer and game developer who had her home address and Social Security 
number leaked online, as well as sexually-explicit photographs doctored to include her face).  
6. The situation presented here is hypothetical, albeit similar to the situation faced by the 
defendant in Moriwaki v. Rynearson, No. 17-2-01463-1, 2018 WL 733811 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 
10, 2018). See infra section II.D. 
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that such an individual would be faced with potential civil and criminal 
consequences. However, given the current law in Washington, courts 
and prosecutors treat the harassing boyfriend situation in the same 
manner as the annoying Facebook commenter.  
 This Comment examines the limits to which states may regulate 
online speech to prevent cyberstalking, an increasingly prevalent form of 
online harassment. Washington is one of the few states that has a 
specific cyberstalking statute and, while some advocates against 
domestic violence hold Washington’s statute up as a model, it is far from 
perfect. 
Part I of this Comment delineates the history of cyberstalking 
generally, with particular attention paid to Washington’s cyberstalking 
statute. This Part also addresses the situations in which state 
governments may constitutionally regulate speech consistent with the 
First Amendment. This Part pays particular attention to areas of First 
Amendment law that pose constitutional challenges to cyberstalking 
statutes, including facial invalidity, overbreadth, and vagueness. 
Part II addresses the constitutionality of Washington’s cyberstalking 
statute by considering the ways in which the statute is vulnerable on 
First Amendment grounds, including facial invalidity, overbreadth, and 
vagueness. State governments have a compelling interest in ensuring that 
people are free from harassment online and that women in particular are 
protected from relationship-based violence;7 however, the statute is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve this end. 
Using Moriwaki v. Rynearson8 as an example, Part II argues that the 
Superior Court of Washington, which overturned a protection order 
wrongfully granted on the basis of protected political speech, got it right. 
However, the court in Moriwaki was not required to reach this 
conclusion based on the language and structure of the Washington 
cyberstalking statute; rather, it pulled from out-of-jurisdiction precedent 
to bolster its conclusion that anonymous speech cannot be criminalized 
when it is not simultaneously unprotected speech.9 Based on the statute’s 
current structure, nothing requires a court to first conclude that the 
challenged speech was, on its own, unconstitutional separate from the 
fact that it was anonymous. This is a fundamental flaw in Washington’s 
law, and a flaw that might well prove fatal. 
                                                     
7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018). 
8. No. 17-2-01463-1, 2018 WL 733811 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2018). 
9. Id. at *9–10 (discussing United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011), in which 
a man who sent critical and caustic tweets about a leader in his former religion had his cyberstalking 
conviction overturned on First Amendment grounds, as “particularly persuasive”).  
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Finally, Part III suggests avenues to ensure that the legitimate scope 
of the cyberstalking statute remains in force while addressing the serious 
shortcomings of the statute as it currently stands. In particular, this Part 
argues that, while the courts could come up with a judicial solution to 
the issues posed by the Washington cyberstalking statute, the best 
solution would be for the Washington legislature to return to the drafting 
table and redraft the statute. 
I. CYBERSTALKING, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND 
RCW 9.61.260 
Part I provides a survey of stalking and cyberstalking, the reasons 
such laws came to be, and the effects of cyberstalking on a victim. The 
bulk of this Part focuses on First Amendment doctrine relevant to 
determining whether Washington’s cyberstalking law is constitutional. 
Beginning with the protection of online speech and anonymous speech 
generally, this Part looks at ways in which a state can regulate harassing 
speech and common pitfalls in such laws. Finally, this Part examines the 
history of Washington’s cyberstalking statute. 
A. Stalking and Cyberstalking Defined 
Stalking is generally defined as repeated conduct directed toward a 
specific person that would cause a reasonable person to feel fear.10 
Offline stalkers can passively stalk victims—such as by making 
harassing phone calls at inappropriate hours. The stalking can also be 
more active, such as following a person, standing outside their home or 
workplace, or threatening harm.11 
While there is no standardized definition for cyberstalking, the term is 
generally defined as directed stalking where the perpetrator utilizes the 
internet, email, or other electronic communications to harass the target, 
causing them to fear for their safety.12 It does not include general 
communications about the victim.13 Repeated private messages targeted 
                                                     
10. Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current 
State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 126 n.6, 133 n.52 (2007); see also Stalking, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1623 (10th ed. 2014). 
11. Ashley N. B. Beagle, Modern Stalking Laws: A Survey of State Anti-Stalking Statutes 
Considering Modern Mediums and Constitutional Challenges, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 457, 463 (2011). 
12. Goodno, supra note 10, at 126; see also CITRON, supra note 2, at 3; Cyberstalking, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 470 (10th ed. 2014). 
13. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1111 
(2011). 
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at a victim would qualify as cyberstalking, but posts about a victim on a 
public social media account would not.14 Examples of cyberstalking 
include repeated threatening or harassing emails or instant messages, the 
creation of websites or social media accounts for the purpose of 
threatening or harassing the target, or encouraging third parties to stalk 
or cause harm to the target via the internet, email, or other electronic 
communications.15 Similarly, cyber harassment “involve[s] the 
intentional infliction of substantial emotional distress accompanied by 
online speech that is persistent enough to amount to a ‘course of 
conduct’ rather than an isolated incident.”16 Cyberstalking is a narrower 
offense than cyber harassment, but, because cyberstalking and cyber 
harassment use the same means to achieve the same ends, many scholars 
use the terms interchangeably.17 
Cyberstalking is distinct from offline forms of stalking in several 
ways. Because the internet is ubiquitous and can be accessed almost 
constantly by both the stalker and the victim, the stalker can harass and 
intimidate their target at any time and from any physical location.18 
Furthermore, it is significantly easier for a person to engage in 
cyberstalking than offline stalking, as it requires less physical effort, is 
cheaper, and can be done from anywhere, from the stalker’s couch to the 
other side of the country.19 This factor in particular makes cyberstalking 
especially taxing on victims, because they never know when they might 
be at risk or where their stalker might be.20 The remote and online nature 
of cyberstalking also allows online stalkers to remain anonymous with 
greater ease than their offline counterparts21; this makes it more difficult 
                                                     
14. CITRON, supra note 2, at 3. 
15. Joey L. Blanch & Wesley L. Hsu, An Introduction to Violent Crime on the Internet, in 64 U.S. 
ATT’YS’ BULL. 2, 3–4 (2016); see also Nisha Ajmani, Cyberstalking and Free Speech: Rethinking 
the Rangel Standard in the Age of the Internet, 90 OR. L. REV. 303, 305 (2011). 
16. CITRON, supra note 2, at 3. 
17. Id.  
18. Aily Shimizu, Domestic Violence in the Digital Age: Towards the Creation of a 
Comprehensive Cyberstalking Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 116, 118 (2013).  
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. While most lawyers, judges, and legislators talk about online speech as “anonymous,” it is 
actually more accurately described as “pseudonymous,” as there are ways for an internet user’s 
identity to be discerned. This Comment will use the term “anonymous” in accordance with this 
practice. For further reading on this point, see George F. DuPont, The Criminalization of True 
Anonymity in Cyberspace, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191 (2001), and David G. Post, 
Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in 
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1996). 
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for victims to identify their stalker and secure protection.22 Finally, 
cyberstalkers can easily impersonate their victims online, taking on their 
identity and wreaking havoc.23 
Cyberstalking can have a longer lasting impact on a victim than 
traditional forms of offline stalking.24 A particularly unpleasant 
encounter or phone call lasts only for the duration of the moment, and 
even if unsettling, can be comparatively easy to avoid by changing one’s 
phone number or moving to a new town. In contrast, online stalking is 
always present and cannot truly be avoided just by averting one’s eyes 
from the computer screen.25 And while the U.S. Supreme Court said in 
2000 that “[w]e are expected to protect our own sensibilities,” this was 
well before the rise of social media, smart phones, and the near-constant 
connection to the internet.26 These changes make internet harassment 
and other forms of cyberstalking more difficult to avoid, and, while at 
least one district court has acknowledged this fact in the context of the 
federal cyberstalking law,27 the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the 
issue. Given the necessity of access and use of the internet in today’s 
society, it is unreasonable to expect victims to stop using the internet to 
avoid stalkers.28 
                                                     
22. Ajmani, supra note 15, at 305. 
23. CITRON, supra note 2, at 8 (“According to a 2009 Microsoft study, nearly 80 percent of 
employers consult search engines to collect intelligence on job applicants, and about 70 perfect of 
the time they reject applicants due to their findings. . . . Recruiters do not contact [applicants] to see 
if they actually posted nude photos of themselves or if someone else did. . . . The simple but 
regrettable truth is that after consulting search results, employers take the path of least resistance. 
They just do not call to schedule interviews or to extend offers.”).  
24. Lipton, supra note 13, at 1113 (“However, in today’s interconnected world that is not a viable 
option, as people who are forced offline forgo important personal and professional opportunities. 
Also, if a victim moves offline, this does not stop others from posting harmful things about her that 
may continue to harm her personal and professional development despite her own choice not to read 
the postings. In many ways, it is better for a victim to know what is being said about her so she can 
take steps to combat the abuses.” (footnote omitted)). 
25. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment 
Laws, and “Cyberstalking”, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 749 (2013) (detailing the differences between 
cyberstalking laws); id. (“But when we hear our telephone ringing, get an envelope in the mail, or 
get an e-mail message—especially when the sender’s identity is unfamiliar—we don’t make the 
same deliberate choice to read a particular item, since we don’t know what that item really is. And 
while we can avoid such intrusions by not having a telephone or an e-mail address, that is 
impractical in modern society.”). 
26. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citing Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 585 (D. Md. 2011), appeal 
dismissed, 12-4084 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012). 
28. John B. Major, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A First Amendment 
Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 127 (2012).  
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Because of these unique characteristics, offline stalking laws are often 
inadequate to handle the realities of cyberstalking. For example, many 
victims of cyberstalking are told, in the absence of such specific 
legislation, that what their harassers are doing is not illegal and either 
that they need to toughen up or that they brought the abuse on 
themselves.29 In light of this, many states enacted laws specifically 
addressing cyberstalking or amended existing laws to include 
cyberstalking.30 Following the high-profile murder of Rebecca Shaeffer, 
an actress who starred in the 1980s sitcom “My Sister Sam,” at the hands 
of her stalker, California enacted the nation’s first anti-stalking law.31 
Many states followed California’s lead in enacting anti-stalking 
legislation, and as the internet became more engrained in everyday life, 
some states also enacted cyberstalking legislation or amended their laws 
to encompass cyberstalking behaviors.32 Washington is among only a 
handful that enacted statutes targeting stalking and cyberstalking 
behaviors separately.33 Washington’s cyberstalking statute is examined 
in depth in section I.D. 
On the federal side, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, a 
cyberstalking statute as part of the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA).34 VAWA criminalizes the use of electronic or computer 
services in interstate commerce to harass, intimidate, kill, or injure or 
engage in surveillance, provided that the conduct places the victim in 
reasonable fear of death or bodily injury or causes substantial emotional 
distress to the victim.35 While § 2261A is a powerful tool to punish 
cyberstalkers, law enforcement does not use it as frequently as state-law 
counterparts because it requires an element of interstate activity.36 
                                                     
29. CITRON, supra note 2, at 19. 
30. Beagle, supra note 11, at 475. 
31. Goodno, supra note 10, at 127–28.   
32. All fifty states had some form of anti-stalking laws by 1995. 
33. Shimizu, supra note 18, at 120–21. As of 2018, only a handful of states have statutes 
specifically criminalizing cyberstalking, as opposed to amending offline stalking statutes to cover 
stalking that occurs via electronic communications. These states include Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Id. at 120 n.39. Illinois’s 
cyberstalking statute was declared unconstitutional in 2017. People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, 
¶ 78. 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018). 
35. Shimizu, supra note 18, at 121. 
36. One of the few times § 2261A has been enforced was in United States v. Matusiewicz, 84 F. 
Supp. 3d 363 (D. Del. 2015). In that case, the defendants harassed the victim, who lived in 
Delaware, from their home in Texas. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Family Members 
Receive Life Sentences for Courthouse Murder Conspiracy (Feb. 19, 2016) [hereinafter DOJ Press 
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Stalking and cyberstalking are serious societal problems that 
disproportionately affect women. The Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention reported that, as of 2014, one in six women, compared with 
one in nineteen men, have faced or will face some form of stalking in 
their lifetime.37 During a twelve-month period, an estimated 1.5% of 
people ages eighteen and older were victims of stalking,38 and 
researchers predict that between 30 and 40% of internet users will deal 
with some form of cyberstalking or cyber harassment in their life.39 
Nearly seven out of ten stalking victims knew the offender in some 
way,40 and women who have ended relationships are the most likely 
victims of stalking.41 One out of four victims of stalking were stalked 
through some form of technology.42 While it is clear that women as a 
group are more likely to face cyberstalking, it is also likely that lesbian, 
transgender, or bisexual women and women of color face an even higher 
risk of cyberstalking.43 
Cyberstalking can have a profound effect on the victim. Victims have 
more difficulty finding jobs, especially in situations where their stalker 
impersonates them online,44 and incur significant financial impact.45 
From legal fees and moving expenses, the average financial impact of 
cyberstalking is more than $1,200.46 Further, victims of cyberstalking 
are more likely to take self-protective measures, and thus pay higher out-
of-pocket costs to feel secure post-stalking.47 Victims often feel their 
privacy has been violated and, as a result, become fearful and paranoid.48 
                                                     
Release], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-family-members-receive-life-sentences-courthouse-
murder-conspiracy [https://perma.cc/CGM6-3NHK]. 
37. DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, 
NATIONAL DATA ON INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AND STALKING (2014), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs-fact-sheet-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JFD-
5ZUB].  
38. SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING VICTIMS IN THE UNITED STATES - 
REVISED 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svus_rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5YH-
22RU].  
39. CITRON, supra note 2, at 12. 
40. CATALANO, supra note 38, at 1. 
41. Id. 
42. Major, supra note 28, at 126.  
43. CITRON, supra note 2, at 14. 
44. Id. at 7–10.  
45. Id. at 10. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Beagle, supra note 11, at 465. 
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This fear and paranoia often manifests itself as a withdrawal from 
society; victims of cyberstalking often find it difficult to maintain their 
pre-stalking relationships and responsibilities, and mental illness is 
common among victims of cyberstalking.49 Victims of cyberstalking 
have higher rates of anxiety, insomnia, social dysfunction, and severe 
depression than they did before the stalking occurred.50 In particular, 
victims of cyberstalking are more prone to post-traumatic stress disorder, 
anorexia nervosa, and anxiety, which tend to grow in severity over 
time.51 In some cases, cyberstalking can escalate beyond harassment, 
leading to the death of the victim either at the hand of the stalker or by 
suicide.52 
These examples demonstrate that cyberstalking is a serious problem 
that legislatures rightly need to address. Despite the obvious impacts of 
cyberstalking on victims and the existence of some laws that criminalize 
such behavior, many victims of cyberstalking are simply told to grow a 
thicker skin, to leave the internet, or to just get over it.53 This is not a 
solution. While there is disagreement among stakeholders about how 
best to accomplish this goal, there is at least consensus that there should 
be reforms to protect people from the harms of cyberstalking.54 
B. First Amendment Challenges to Cyberstalking Laws 
The First Amendment states that Congress “shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”55 Courts have interpreted this 
to apply to speech as well as expressive conduct.56 The First Amendment 
applies to the states through the process of incorporation via the 
                                                     
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. CITRON, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
52. See, e.g., United States v. Matusiewicz, 84 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D. Del. 2015) (a man, his mother, 
and his brother cyberstalked the man’s ex-wife across state lines, ultimately leading the man’s 
brother to shoot his ex-sister-in-law before shooting himself); DOJ Press Release, supra note 36 
(“The successful prosecution and sentencing of the defendants responsible in the first federal 
conviction of cyber-stalking resulting in death is truly welcomed news for all federal, state and local 
law enforcement involved in the investigation.”).  
53. CITRON, supra note 2, at 19.  
54. For example, Professor Danielle Citron Keats grounds her analysis of cyberstalking and cyber 
harassment by calling for reform of federal civil rights laws so that they can be used to seek redress 
from an alleged cyberstalker in addition to tort and criminal actions. Id. at 120. 
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
56. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (overturning a Texas law that prohibited 
dishonoring the American flag on First Amendment grounds).  
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Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.57 Thus, state governments 
may not “restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”58 In contrast, regulation is content-neutral if the 
government regulates speech for reasons other than disagreement with 
the message the targeted speech contains.59 Content-based laws are 
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified and upheld only if 
the government proves they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.60 Regulation of speech is content-based if “a law applies to 
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed.”61 While some content-based regulations are obvious on their 
face, some are more subtle and “defin[e] regulated speech by its function 
or purpose.”62 
When considering whether a speech restriction serves a compelling 
state interest, courts consider several principles.63 The government 
cannot prioritize or privilege certain subclasses of core-protected speech 
over others; among these core speech areas is political speech.64 Further, 
the government may not prohibit speech merely because society finds it 
                                                     
57. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of 
speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
58. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) 
(“The First Amendment . . . prohibits laws that abridge the freedom of speech. When enforcing this 
prohibition, our precedents distinguish between content-based and content-neutral regulations of 
speech. . . . As a general matter, [content-based regulations] ‘are presumptively unconstitutional and 
may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling 
state interests.’ This stringent standard reflects the fundamental principle that governments have ‘no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
59. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
60. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992). 
61. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).  
62. Id.  
63. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2419–20 (1996). 
64. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).  
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disagreeable or offensive.65 The under-inclusive nature of a statute may 
be an indication that the law does not serve a compelling interest.66 
Courts have further held that “the sensitivity and significance of the 
interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and [state law] 
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly 
than the appropriate context of the instant case.”67 That is, the remedy 
proposed by the state must be narrowly tailored to address the context of 
the problem. If a state does attempt to regulate speech based on its 
content, it must have a compelling interest to do so.68 Courts have held 
that goals such as protecting the physical and psychological wellbeing of 
children69 and preventing harassment generally are sufficient to meet the 
compelling-interest requirement.70 In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has said that “[w]here the designed benefit of a content-based speech 
restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that 
the right of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative 
exists,” implicitly holding that there is no compelling state interest based 
solely on protecting those who are “sensitive.”71 
While there have historically been limitations on harassing “one-to-
one” speech made to a particular person, governments cannot regulate 
“one-to-many” speech about a particular person.72 Because cyber 
harassment behaviors may include speech not specifically addressed at 
the particular victim, and occur frequently on public platforms like 
Twitter and Facebook, cyberstalking laws that “restrict or punish public 
communications” are more susceptible to First Amendment attacks.73 
                                                     
65. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 
(1991) (holding that New York’s “Son of Sam” statute that required that income from a work 
describing an accused or convicted criminal’s work be deposited in an escrow account available to 
victims of their crime or their creditors was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments); id. (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990))). 
66.  See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.F.J., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (finding that a Florida statute 
criminalizing the publication of the name of the victim of a sexual offense unconstitutional on First 
Amendment grounds because its underinclusive focus on mass communications did not show 
compelling state interests). 
67.  Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011) (quoting Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533). 
68. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992). 
69. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982).  
70. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 409–10 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority opinion 
recognizes preventing harassment as a compelling state interest). 
71. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
72. Volokh, supra note 25, at 742. 
73. Shimizu, supra note 18, at 131–32. 
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However, since cyberstalking is, by definition, specifically directed at 
one person, the one-to-one versus the one-to-many issue is not 
concerning so long as the statute regulates speech directed at a specific 
individual rather than speech about a specific individual.74 
Cyberstalking laws are vulnerable to challenges on First Amendment 
grounds because they have the potential to restrict protected speech and 
discriminate based on content. Laws targeting cyberstalking, including 
specific laws tailored to address the crime and expanded interpretations 
of traditional stalking laws, exist in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia; however, this does not mean that all such laws are 
constitutionally sound.75 Several states were forced to “dramatically 
narrow” the scope of their cyberstalking bills before sending them to the 
state governor for signature in order to avoid future legal challenges on 
First Amendment grounds.76 Some scholars speculate that even the 
cyberstalking provision of VAWA is “patently unconstitutional.”77 And 
in 2017, the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down the state’s 
cyberstalking law as facially unconstitutional.78 
These statutes all endeavor to remedy a wrong that many think should 
be discouraged; however, laws targeting cyberstalking may not do so at 
the expense of protected forms of speech. States should be cautious in 
drafting and enforcing such laws. Courts are willing to strike down these 
laws when they too broadly infringe on individuals’ right to speak. Of 
particular importance are constitutional challenges based on the rights to 
free speech online and anonymous speech. 
1. Right to Free Speech Online 
Online speech stands “on the same footing” as other speech and 
cannot be regulated simply because it occurs online.79 As the U.S. 
Supreme Court once said, “whatever the challenges of applying the 
Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles of 
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, 
                                                     
74. Lipton, supra note 13, at 1111.  
75. See, e.g., People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 78 (striking down the state’s cyberstalking 
stature on First Amendment and due process grounds). 
76. Volokh, supra note 25, at 739–40 (discussing cyberstalking bills from Tennessee and Arizona 
that were narrowed in response to public outcry before becoming law).  
77. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1590 (2007). 
78. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 78. 
79. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).  
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do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication 
appears.’”80 States may regulate speech that offers such negligible social 
value that it is “outweighed by social interests in order and social 
morality,” so long as the regulations are in accord with the First 
Amendment.81 Similarly, “the First Amendment doesn’t allow us to 
weigh the pros and cons of certain types of speech.”82 Public spaces have 
been used for public debate and assembly since the beginning of the 
republic.83 While traditionally these public spaces consisted of public 
property, public forums have now expanded to include internet 
platforms, even those that are privately owned.84 Speech which occurs in 
these public spaces cannot be restricted “simply because it is upsetting 
or arouses contempt.”85 
The first Supreme Court case to recognize freedom of speech online, 
Reno v. ACLU,86 held a provision of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA) unconstitutional under the First Amendment.87 The CDA 
prohibited, inter alia, the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent 
images to any recipient under the age of eighteen by means of a 
telecommunication or electronic device.88 Plaintiffs challenged the child-
protection provisions of the CDA, arguing that the law would, for 
example, penalize libraries from providing information on “[e]verything 
from online sex education, medical information, literature, art, music, 
and politics to everyday discourse.”89 The Court held that sexually 
explicit, but not obscene,90 speech addressed to adults was protected by 
                                                     
80. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). 
81. Katherine McCabe, Founding Era Free Speech Theory: Applying Traditional Speech 
Protection to the Regulation of Anonymous Cyberspeech, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 823, 843 (2014). 
82. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 711 (9th Cir. 2010). 
83. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456 (2011) (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 
(1988)).  
84. While this point is outside the scope of this Comment, see generally Marc Rohr, First 
Amendment Fora Revisited: How Many Categories Are There?, 41 NOVA L. REV. 221 (2017). 
85. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458.  
86. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 859.  
89. Brief of Appellees Am. Library Ass’n et al. at 13, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 884 (1997) (No. 
96-511). 
90. The word “obscene” is a legal term of art in the First Amendment context, as first defined in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts . . . in a 
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the First Amendment and could not be suppressed simply because some 
adults found it inappropriate for children.91 The Reno Court further held 
that neither the unique character of the internet, nor the legitimate need 
to protect children from age-inappropriate content, were sufficient 
grounds to outweigh the First Amendment rights of those burdened by 
the Act.92 
Following the Court’s decision in Reno, Congress enacted the Child 
Online Protection Act (COPA).93 COPA strove to do constitutionally 
what the CDA had unsuccessfully attempted to accomplish: criminalize 
the knowing posting or sharing of online content, for commercial 
purposes, which would be harmful to minors.94 It too was swiftly 
challenged and found unconstitutional.95 The Supreme Court held that, 
because there were less restrictive ways to protect children from 
offensive material, a lower court had not abused its discretion in 
enjoining enforcement of COPA.96 In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Stevens wrote that he and Justice Ginsburg would have decided the case 
based on their belief that “the Government may not penalize speakers for 
making available to the general World Wide Web audience” speech 
which some might object to; thus, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg firmly 
grounded themselves in the reasoning laid out in Reno.97 Justices 
Stevens’s and Ginsburg’s point is of particular import because, while 
they agreed that COPA unconstitutionally infringed on online speech, 
they focused not on the fact that it failed to be narrowly tailored. Instead, 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg focused on the law’s prioritization of 
certain classes of speech over others.98 Rather than pointing out, as the 
majority did, that there was a constitutional, more narrowly-tailored 
means to achieve the ends of COPA, Justice Stevens’s and Ginsburg’s 
concurrence emphasizes the fact that the government may never regulate 
speech based on its content unless it serves a compelling state interest.99 
                                                     
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the ‘utterly without redeeming social value test . . . .” 
(citations omitted)).  
91. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874–75 (quoting F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)). 
92. Id. at 867–68.  
93. Codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 231 (2000). 
94. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004). 
95. Id.  
96. Id. at 673.  
97. Id. at 674 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
98. Id. at 675. 
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Thus, the freedom to speak freely online has been ensured by the 
courts.100 
2. The Right to Anonymous Speech 
The First Amendment also protects the right to anonymous speech, 
both online and offline. Many of the cases enshrining anonymous speech 
have their roots in election law, where the courts first recognized that 
“an author’s decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”101 
The roots of anonymous speech in the United States run deep. 
Anonymous speech has been used as a tool of social agitation and 
political advocacy since the Founding Era; many of the Founding 
Fathers utilized the protections of anonymous speech in order to 
effectively advocate for treason against the Crown.102 Anonymous 
speech flourished in the debate surrounding the ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution. On one side, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James 
Madison wrote the Federalist Papers under the pseudonym Publius.103 In 
opposition, the Anti-Federalists were represented by Cato, Brutus, 
Centinel, and Founding Farmer.104 If anything, an originalist 
interpretation of the First Amendment requires protection of anonymous 
speech, especially when that speech is political in nature.105 While 
United States courts have not reflexively protected speech simply 
because it was written anonymously, the courts have also not rescinded 
                                                     
99. Id. (“As a parent, grandparent, and great-grandparent, I endorse [the goal of protecting 
children from obscenity online] without reservation. As a judge, however, I must confess to a 
growing sense of unease when the interest in protecting children from prurient materials is invoked 
as a justification for using criminal regulation of speech as a substitute for, or a simple backup to, 
adult oversight of children’s viewing habits. In view of the gravity of the burdens COPA imposes on 
Web speech, the possibility that Congress might have accomplished the goal of protecting children 
from harmful materials by other, less drastic means is a matter to be considered with special care.”). 
100. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641–42 (1995).  
101. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). 
102. See generally THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (Simon & Brown 2010) (1776). 
103. See generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS (Penguin Random House 2003) (1788); Post, supra note 21, at 156 (discussing whether the 
Ohio law at issue in McIntyre would have, ironically, banned distribution of the Federalist Papers 
because they were anonymously written and published).   
104. See generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS (Ralph Ketcham ed., Penguin Random House 
2003) (1788); Post, supra note 21, at 155 n.38 (discussing the McIntyre Court’s allusions to both the 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers as examples of how anonymous political speech forms the 
backbone of the Republic). 
105. McCabe, supra note 81, at 827.  
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protections from speech merely because it was anonymous. Anonymous 
speech in the United States is a nuanced creature typified by balancing 
tests to determine whether the democratic or artistic value of the speech 
is outweighed by some need to identify its source.106 
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,107 the hallmark case 
protecting the right to anonymous speech, the Court held that an Ohio 
statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature 
was unconstitutional.108 While the state argued that the law was a 
reasonable regulation of the electoral process, the U.S. Supreme Court 
disagreed; the Court held that the law regulated “pure speech” in 
violation of the First Amendment despite the state’s legitimate interests 
in regulating the electoral process.109 The Court further held that the 
decision to remain anonymous was like any other editorial decision, and, 
as such, the government could not compel its disclosure.110 Because the 
law was not cabined to regulate fraudulent or libelous speech, speech 
that is already not protected by the First Amendment, the Court 
concluded that the law was unconstitutional.111 The Court stated that 
“[t]he right to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields 
fraudulent conduct. But political speech by its nature will sometimes 
have unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our society accords 
greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its 
misuse.”112 While the Court did not establish that anonymity was an 
absolute right, it also did not establish a test to determine when 
anonymity would be protected.113 
More recent courts, however, have shown a willingness to forgo 
protections of anonymous speech when anonymity does not serve an 
important speech interest. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 
that disclosure of the identities of signers of anti-gay marriage 
referendum petitions under the Washington Public Records Act would 
                                                     
106. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194–97 (2010) (balancing First Amendment interest in 
remaining anonymous in referendum petitions with states’ compelling interest in regulating the 
electoral process).  
107. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).  
108. Id. at 337–38, 357.  
109. Id. at 345. 
110. Id. at 342. 
111. Id. at 357. 
112. Id. 
113. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 77, at 1545. 
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generally not violate the First Amendment.114 In this case, Doe v. 
Reed,115 the Court determined that the State of Washington’s compelling 
interest in preserving electoral integrity outweighed signatories’ right to 
anonymous political speech.116 However, the Court also held that if 
signatories could demonstrate that disclosure of their identities (and, 
consequently, their political beliefs) would cause them to face 
harassment and threats, disclosure of their identities might be exempted 
under the Act; the Court remanded this point for further 
determination.117 
The right to anonymous speech has been extended to speech on the 
internet as well. Courts have recognized that the “free exchange of ideas 
on the [i]nternet is driven in large part by the ability of [i]nternet users to 
communicate anonymously.”118 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said 
“the ability to speak anonymously on the [i]nternet promotes the robust 
exchange of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely 
without ‘fear of economic or official retaliation . . . [or] concern about 
social ostracism.’”119 Courts have repeatedly upheld the right to 
anonymous speech online, because the “ability to speak one’s mind” 
online “without the burden of the other party knowing all the facts about 
one’s identity can foster open communication and robust debate.”120 To 
strip internet speakers of their anonymity would significantly chill 
speech online and thus chill basic First Amendment rights.121 Courts 
have held that “[p]eople who have committed no wrongdoing should be 
free to participate in online forums without fear that their identity will be 
exposed under the authority of the court.”122 
                                                     
114. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010) (reserving the question of whether disclosing 
signatories of this particular referendum petition was constitutional under the First Amendment for 
the district court).  
115. 561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
116. Id. at 202. 
117. Id. at 200 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 367 (2010)).  
118. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
119. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in 
original) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995)).  
120. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
121. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1093; see also Mount Hope Church v. Bash Back!, No. 
C11-536RAJ, 2011 WL 13116849, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2011). 
122. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
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3. Regulating Harassing Speech 
Despite the broad protections provided by the First Amendment, the 
right to speech is not absolute. Some categories of speech are never 
protected by the First Amendment.123 Fighting words, for example, is a 
term of art that encompasses “words likely to cause an average 
addressee to fight . . . when said without a disarming smile.”124 The First 
Amendment does not protect “fighting words” because the Amendment 
does not permit “a breach of the peace.”125 Calls for imminent violence 
are also not protected speech under the First Amendment.126 Similarly, 
the First Amendment does not protect speech integral to criminal 
conduct.127 Obscene speech is also not protected by the First 
Amendment.128 Despite the fact that the general public might consider a 
wide range of speech to be “obscene,” the Court has narrowly defined 
the term: “no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure 
of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently 
offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
regulating state law.”129 True threats are also not protected by the First 
Amendment because “[t]rue threats inflict great harm and have little if 
any social value.”130 However, true threats do not include political 
hyperbole, and thus hyperbole is protected.131 And while the Court has 
                                                     
123. Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173. While many scholars, and the Court for that 
matter, speak about “categories” of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment, it is not 
that clearly cut.  
124. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 
A.2d 754, 762 (N.H. 1941)) (holding that appellations of “damned racketeer” and “damned Fascist” 
were likely to provoke a reasonable person to retaliate against the speaker and cause a breach of the 
peace and were thus “fighting words”).  
125. Id. at 573.  
126. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding that a Klu Klux Klan member who 
did not advocate imminent violence could not be charged under Ohio law against criminal 
syndicalism because the law did not distinguish between the challenged statement and “incitement 
to imminent lawless action” that could be regulated under the law). 
127. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).  
128. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
129. Id. at 27. Even within this narrow definition, child pornography, for example, is subject to 
even stricter regulation than other forms of “hard core” pornography. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 
535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (“As a general rule, pornography can be banned only if obscene, but 
under [New York v.] Ferber, pornography showing minors can be proscribed whether or not the 
images are obscene under the definition set forth in Miller v. California.” (citation omitted)). 
130. Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (citing Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2004)). 
131. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706, 708 (1969) (Defendant’s alleged statement that 
he would refuse being drafted into armed forces and “if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man 
I want in my sights is L.B.J.” did not amount to a threat against the President). 
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acknowledged that a communication can contain both a threat and 
statement of value entitled to protection, the threat does not, by 
association, get the constitutional protection afforded the statement of 
value.132 
While recognizing the long-standing precedent of discussing 
“categories” of speech as unprotected by the First Amendment, the 
Court has slowly distanced itself from the categorical approach.133 
Governments may regulate these areas of speech “because of their 
constitutionally proscribable content,” not because they are “categories 
of speech . . . invisible to the Constitution.”134 There is no “categorical 
‘harassment exception’” to the First Amendment free speech clause.135 
In fact, the Supreme Court has time and again held that distressing or 
outrageous speech is protected under the First Amendment unless and 
until its content crosses over into one of the unprotected areas discussed 
above.136 This is because courts cannot engage in “an ad hoc balancing 
of relative social costs and benefits” when determining whether speech 
is protected.137 
However, there are ways for state and federal governments to regulate 
harassing speech. First, they may frame harassment as non-expressive 
conduct rather than speech.138 Because non-expressive conduct is not 
speech, the First Amendment does not apply. Governments can and do 
regulate harmful non-expressive conduct, and the First Amendment does 
                                                     
132. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reversing 
conviction of a man who posted violent rap lyrics on his Facebook page because it was not proven 
that he intended for the lyrics to constitute threats or knew that the lyrics would be seen as threats). 
133. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“I believe that categories alone cannot satisfactorily resolve the legal problem before 
us. The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive 
objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, 
such as ‘content discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit. In my view, the category 
‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, 
rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.”).  
134. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (emphasis omitted). 
135. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2010).  
136. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)); United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. 
Supp. 2d 574, 582 (D. Md. 2011) (referencing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)); see also 
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 457 (2011); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
137. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
138. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995) 
(holding that the government could not compel an Irish-American Catholic organization to allow an 
LGBT group to participate in their St. Patrick’s Day parade); id. (“While the law is free to promote 
all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better 
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened 
either purpose may strike the government.”). 
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not prevent restrictions aimed at conduct from imposing incidental 
burdens on speech.139 
Second, governments may regulate harassing speech when that 
speech arises to fighting words or true threats.140 Similar to non-
expressive conduct, speech that arises to fighting words or true threats 
are not considered speech for purposes of the First Amendment; even 
still, such regulations must not engage in viewpoint discrimination.141 
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a city ordinance, 
which made it a misdemeanor to burn crosses or swastikas with the 
intent to incite anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, religion, or gender, was unconstitutional because it engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination.142 In so holding, the Court emphasized that 
“[t]he point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be 
expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its 
content.”143 The Court further stated that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional because the regulation was based not on the content 
communicated, but rather because the “content embodies a particularly 
intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea 
the speaker wishes to convey.”144 Because the ordinance banned all 
manners of communication of racial, religious, or gender intolerance 
rather than, for example, fighting words that communicated such 
intolerances, the law was unconstitutional.145 
In contrast, the Court concluded that Virginia was within its power to 
prohibit cross burnings “in light of cross burning’s long and pernicious 
history as a signal of impending violence.”146 Alluding to its prior cross-
burning cases, including R.A.V., the Court here did not prohibit all forms 
of content-based discrimination; to the contrary, the Court continued to 
emphasize that “‘[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists 
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is 
proscribable,” the speech can be regulated without “significant danger of 
                                                     
139. Compare Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (holding that a Vermont law 
restricting sale of pharmacy records that revealed prescribing practice of individual doctors was a 
restriction of speech, not conduct), with Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 804 
(9th Cir. 2015) (holding that Seattle minimum wage ordinance regulated conduct, not speech). 
140. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2004).  
141. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). 
142. Id. at 392. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 393 (emphases omitted). 
145. Id. at 394. 
146. Virginia v. Black, 537 U.S. 343, 363 (2004). 
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idea or viewpoint discrimination.”147 Because the entire class of speech 
at issue here was proscribable on such “neutral” grounds, the Court 
continued, “[s]uch a reason . . . is also neutral enough to form the basis 
of distinction within the class.”148 Thus, the Virginia law at issue here 
banned cross burning with the intent to intimidate; because intimidation 
was already proscribable under the First Amendment, and the underlying 
law was not enacted because the speech at issue was explicitly 
disfavored by the government, the law was constitutional.149 Here, 
Virginia could constitutionally engage in viewpoint discrimination and 
target a specific subset of intimidating speech, because “a State [may] 
choose to prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely 
to inspire fear of bodily harm.”150 The First Amendment protects speech 
that is abusive or vicious unless it is non-expressive conduct, fighting 
words, or true threats, all areas by and large unprotected by the 
guarantee of free speech.151 
Finally, states may regulate harassing speech when it can pass strict 
scrutiny. While states cannot regulate harassing speech based solely on 
its secondary effects,152 including listeners’ reactions to that speech, 
where harassing speech crosses the line into unprotected speech or 
transforms into conduct, states are then within their power to regulate 
it.153 If the state can demonstrate that its regulation is narrowly tailored 
to achieve its stated goal, courts will uphold its statute even though it 
regulates speech based on its content.154 
                                                     
147. Id. at 361–62 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388). 
148. Id. (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388).  
149. Id. at 362. 
150. Id. at 363. 
151. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.  
152. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (holding that a zoning 
ordinance requiring adult movie theaters to be more than 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- 
or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park and more than one mile of any school was not an 
unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech but instead targeted the effect such theaters 
would have on the neighborhoods surrounding them). 
153. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–64 (2011) (finding that Vermont 
could not restrict the sale, disclosure, and use of records that revealed prescribing practices of 
individual doctors in accord with the First Amendment because it was not a commercial regulation 
that imposed only an incidental burden on speech of pharmaceutical companies). 
154. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27, 2232 (2015) 
(finding that an Arizona law did not survive strict scrutiny because it was content-discriminatory on 
its face and did not serve a compelling government interest).  
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4. Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges 
Plaintiffs can make two types of challenges under the First 
Amendment. Plaintiffs may make an as-applied challenge and argue the 
law is unconstitutional as applied to their specific situation.155 In 
contrast, a plaintiff might make a facial challenge and argue that the law 
is unconstitutional as applied to anyone.156 While a facial challenge 
assumes that the law is unconstitutional on all fronts, an as-applied 
challenge foresees that the law could, hypothetically, be constitutionally 
applied to someone else.157 Courts are generally skeptical of facial 
challenges and, as a consequence, facial challenges are more rare and 
generally less successful than as-applied challenges.158 This is largely 
due to the judiciary’s decision to accord respect and defer to the 
legislature, as well as a means of constitutional avoidance.159 
When a plaintiff makes an as-applied challenge, they only seek to 
reverse the penalty suffered as a result of the application of the law to 
them. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the 
application of its cyberstalking statute was unconstitutional as applied to 
a criminal defendant because the mere fact that the victim did not wish 
to be part of a conversation that was neither annoying nor alarming did 
not constitute harassment under the state’s cyberstalking statute.160 In 
that case, an au pair brought suit when her employer repeatedly 
contacted her, demanding that she comply with an employment 
agreement.161 The Court concluded that the Connecticut law was not 
applied content-neutrally and failed to regulate the harassing manner in 
which the contested speech was made.162 The Court further held that, to 
regulate language that is alarming or annoying, “the manner of 
communication must be something more than that there was a 
                                                     
155. Fourth Amendment – Standing – Facial Versus As-Applied Challenges – City of Los 
Angeles v. Patel, Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 181, 246 (2015). 
156. Id. at 246. 
157. Id. at 246–47. 
158. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third Party Standing, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321–22 (2000). 
159. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (“Facial invalidation 
‘is, manifestly, strong medicine’ that ‘has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last 
resort.’” (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of 
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“Although facial challenges to legislation are generally 
disfavored, they have been permitted in the First Amendment context where the [statutory] 
scheme . . . is challenged as overbroad.”).  
160. State v. Nowacki, 111 A.3d 911, 930–31 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015). 
161. Id. at 917–18. 
162. Id. at 928–29. 
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communication. Rather, the communication must be made in a form 
likely to be viewed as annoying or alarming.”163 Characterizing the 
exchange as one between a contractor and a contractee, the Court found 
the law unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.164 
Similarly, the District Court of Maryland held a federal cyberstalking 
law was unconstitutional as applied.165 In that case, a disgruntled former 
member of a Buddhist sect used Twitter and his blog to send harassing 
messages to the sect leader, causing her significant emotional distress.166 
Though the court considered the facial validity of the law and examined 
whether there was a compelling state interest at issue, the court 
ultimately concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as applied and 
thus did not reach the facial issue.167 The court did not explain its 
reasoning in reaching its conclusion that the law was unconstitutional as 
applied.168 
An as-applied challenge may have facial repercussions.169 When a 
court is faced with a challenge to a law on as-applied grounds, it may 
“engage in reasoning that marks the statute as unenforceable in its 
totality. . . . [D]octrinal tests of constitutional validity can produce what 
are effectively facial challenges.”170 For example, a group of abortion 
providers seeking as-applied relief from a Texas law that required 
abortion facilities to meet certain requirements and to have admitting 
privileges was struck down as facially unconstitutional.171 
5. Overbreadth 
The overbreadth doctrine is a type of facial challenge that combats 
fears that an overbroad law will chill protected speech.172 Because of this 
fear, “[t]he Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad 
laws that chill speech within the First Amendment’s vast and privileged 
sphere.”173 For a statute to be declared unconstitutional on overbreadth 
                                                     
163. Id. at 930 (emphasis omitted). 
164. Id. at 931. 
165. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 588 (D. Md. 2011). 
166. Id. at 578–79. 
167. Id. at 585–87. 
168. Id. at 588. 
169. Fallon, supra note 158, at 1327–28. 
170. Id. 
171. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2319–20 (2016). 
172. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 94 (7th ed. 2016).  
173. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (holding that the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act’s prohibition on “virtual” child pornography was overbroad because it 
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grounds, the overbreadth must be substantial in comparison to a law’s 
legitimate sweep.174 The fact that “some impermissible applications of a 
statute [exist] is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth 
challenge.”175 There must be a realistic danger that the challenged statute 
will “significantly compromise recognized First Amendment 
protections . . . for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth 
grounds.”176 Legislatures may add severability provisions to their statute 
to save the statute from being struck down entirely if one part is deemed 
unconstitutional.177 However, a severability clause is an “aid . . . not an 
inexorable command,” and thus courts are not bound to follow them in 
striking statutes as unconstitutional.178 
Cyberstalking laws are frequently challenged on overbreadth grounds; 
for example, in 2017, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down that state’s 
cyberstalking statute as unconstitutionally overbroad.179 The Illinois 
cyberstalking statute provided that a person commits cyberstalking when 
they harass another person through the use of electronic communications 
two or more times and threaten that person or their family, places that 
person or their family in reasonable fear of harm, or solicits a third party 
to cause fear or harm to that person or their family.180 Further, the statute 
provided that a person commits cyberstalking when they engage in a 
course of conduct using electronic communication directed at a specific 
person that they know or should know would cause a reasonable person 
to fear for the safety of themselves or their family or suffer other 
emotional distress.181 
The defendant in that case was charged with cyberstalking for 
harassing a radio personality via email and Facebook and challenged his 
conviction, alleging that the Illinois cyberstalking statute violated his 
First Amendment rights.182 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that, 
                                                     
did not serve the same compelling interest as a ban on actual child pornography and thus abridged 
the freedom to engage in substantial amounts of lawful speech).  
174. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for 
Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).  
175. State v. Bradford, 175 Wash. App. 912, 922, 308 P.3d 736, 741 (2013) (quoting Members of 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)).  
176. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574 (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801).  
177. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 (1985). 
178. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2319 (2016) (quoting 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884–85 n.49 (1997)).  
179. People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 78. 
180. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5(a-3) (2018).  
181. Id. 5/12-7.5(a-1). 
182. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶¶ 1–16.  
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while the state could regulate speech that was integrally related to 
criminal conduct or that amounted to true threats, the cyberstalking 
statute criminalized protected online speech.183 Under the terms of the 
statute, a court could find a person guilty of cyberstalking if they knew 
or should have known that online complaints about a local business 
would cause the owner emotional distress.184 The Court held that there 
was no limiting construction of the statute available and, accordingly, 
struck down the statute as unconstitutionally infringing on the right to 
free speech.185 
C. Washington’s Cyberstalking Law 
In 2004, Washington enacted one of the first state statutes directly 
criminalizing cyberstalking. The text of the statute provides that: 
A person is guilty of cyberstalking if he or she, with intent to 
harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass any other person, and 
under circumstances not constituting telephone harassment, 
makes an electronic communication to such other person or a 
third party:  
(a)  Using any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or obscene words, 
images, or language, or suggesting the commission of any 
lewd or lascivious act;186 [or] 
(b)  Anonymously or repeatedly whether or not conversation 
occurs; or 
(c)  Threatening to inflict injury on the person or property of the 
person called or any member of his or her family or 
household.187 
                                                     
183. Id. ¶¶ 34–48. 
184. Id. ¶¶ 53–57. 
185. Id. ¶¶ 60, 67–78. 
186. Washington courts have tended to define “lewd” and “indecent” in a problematically broad 
manner. See, e.g., State v. Bell, No. 70358–7–I, 2014 WL 4715519, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 
2014) (“‘Indecent’ is defined as: ‘not decent: . . . altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature 
of things for which circumstances would dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly suitable: 
unseemly.’ ‘Obscene’ is defined as: ‘marked by violation of accepted language inhibitions and by 
the use of words regarded as taboo in polite usage.’ Ms. Lansdowne used the word ‘bitch’ not in 
reference to a female dog, but in reference to a female human being. Such usage is both indecent 
and obscene as those words are commonly defined. A rational trier of fact could have determined 
that Ms. Lansdowne’s words were indecent or obscene.’” (quoting State v. Landsowne, 111 Wash. 
App. 882, 891–92, 46 P.3d 836, 840 (2002) (citations omitted))). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972), that only obscene, not indecent, speech can be 
regulated properly under the First Amendment. However, this Comment will assume for the 
purposes of argument that the obscenity provision of section 9.61.260 of the Revised Code of 
Washington is constitutional.   
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Section 9.61.260 of the Revised Code of Washington requires that the 
alleged cyberstalker intend to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass 
their target. This makes cyberstalking a specific intent crime. Specific 
intent is the “intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is 
later charged with.”188 A defendant’s primary defense against a charge of 
cyberstalking is that they lacked the requisite intent to commit the crime. 
However, many cases in which an individual is charged with 
cyberstalking focus on the effect the alleged stalker’s speech had on 
their target or what a reasonable person’s response to the stalker’s 
speech would have been, rather than the defendant’s intent in 
communicating with the victim.189 While courts have generally accepted 
the different intent portions of the statute, some courts have expressed 
some apprehension with regards to the “intent to . . . embarrass” 
prong.190 
Washington’s cyberstalking statute is almost identical to the state’s 
telephone harassment statute,191 and, while the telephone harassment 
statute has faced many constitutional challenges, none have successfully 
challenged its anonymity provisions.192 Similarly, Washington’s stalking 
statute193 has been challenged on First Amendment grounds, to little 
avail.194 In a recent case challenging the offline stalking statute on First 
Amendment grounds, the Washington Court of Appeals held that 
because the statute criminalized conduct, not speech, and the statute 
explicitly said it did not cover constitutionally protected activities, the 
stalking statute was constitutionally sound.195 
Based on testimony before the Washington State House of 
Representatives and Senate, legislators enacted RCW 9.61.260 to 
                                                     
187. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.260(1) (2018) (emphasis added).  
188.  Specific Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (10th ed. 2014). 
189. While there are no cases looking at the specific intent of the anonymous speech provision of 
section 9.61.260(1)(b), there is at least one case analyzing the intent element with regards to true 
threats under (1)(c). See State v. Kohonen, 192 Wash. App. 567, 574–76, 370 P.3d 16, 21 (2016) 
(“The test for determining a ‘true threat’ is an objective test that focuses on the speaker. The 
question is whether a reasonable person in the speaker’s position would foresee that the threat 
would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to inflict the harm threatened.” (citations 
omitted)).  
190. State v. Stanley, 2017 WL 3868480, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017) (“In view of the 
limited briefing, we do not decide whether the intent to embarrass in the cyberstalking statute 
renders the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.”).  
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.230 (2018). 
192. Stanley, 2017 WL 3868480, at *6. 
193. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.46.110 (2018). 
194. State v. Bradford, 175 Wash. App. 921, 921–22, 308 P.3d 736, 740 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).  
195. Id.  
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address the “expression of an old crime”: violence against women, in the 
new medium of the internet.196 One particularly egregious case 
motivated the legislature to act; “[f]or over five years, an anonymous 
stalker sent malicious emails to the [anonymous] victim” and her co-
workers.197 The stalker pretended to be the victim in online chat rooms 
and went so far as to post her home and work phone numbers with 
suggestions that she was looking for sexual partners.198 The victim 
reported the harassment to police, but the police reported that they could 
not help her as her stalker had not broken the law.199 Upon hearing these 
experiences, the victim’s state representative and senator sponsored the 
cyberstalking bill.200 
While there has been significant case law on the provisions targeting 
lewd or obscene messages and threatening statements, only one person 
has been the subject of an anti-stalking order on the basis of anonymous 
or repeated speech under RCW 9.61.260(1)(b). In November 2016, 
Richard Rynearson, a “self-proclaimed activist,” became Facebook 
friends with Clarence Moriwaki, a local figure on Bainbridge Island, 
Washington, and the volunteer-founder of the Bainbridge Island 
Japanese-American Exclusion Memorial.201 After several “cordial” 
interactions, in early 2017 Rynearson authored numerous Facebook 
posts criticizing Moriwaki for not condemning political figures that 
supported the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA).202 
Rynearson did not support provisions of the NDAA that he believed 
permitted internment-like detention of American citizens overseas, and 
believed that Moriwaki was hypocritical in supporting these politicians 
while also being outspoken on the issue of Japanese internment.203 
Rynearson sent direct messages and authored Facebook posts criticizing 
Moriwaki, even though Moriwaki asked Rynearson to stop.204 Moriwaki 
eventually blocked Rynearson from posting on his personal page, at 
which point Rynearson made a Facebook Group named “Clarence 
                                                     






201. Rynearson v. Ferguson, No. 3:17-cv-05531 RBL, 2017 WL 4517790, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 10, 2017). 
202. Id. 
203. Id.  
204. Id.  
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Moriwaki of Bainbridge Island,” where he posted memes critical of 
Moriwaki.205 
In March 2017, Moriwaki obtained a temporary stalking protection 
order against Rynearson in state superior court.206 Rynearson asked the 
local prosecuting attorney if there were plans to prosecute him for 
cyberstalking Moriwaki.207 The attorney said that they would not file 
charges at that time.208 In response to Moriwaki’s petition for a 
permanent stalking protection order in October, however, Rynearson 
officially challenged, inter alia, the constitutionality of Washington’s 
cyberstalking statute under the First Amendment in district court.209 
Ultimately, the district court denied and dismissed Rynearson’s petition, 
holding that Rynearson should bring his constitutional challenge in the 
state court stalking order proceedings.210 
In January 2018, the Superior Court for Kitsap County reversed and 
vacated the stalking order on First Amendment grounds, holding that the 
online behavior engaged in by Rynearson did not amount to “stalking 
conduct” that justified the issuance of a stalking order.211 The court 
characterized Rynearson’s speech as “‘picketing’ on the internet” in 
holding that he was entitled to voice his opinions, even if they made 
Moriwaki uncomfortable.212 Analogizing the Moriwaki’s public 
Facebook page to public property, the court held that “Rynearson’s 
public internet postings opining about Moriwaki’s involvement with [a 
local Japanese internment memorial] are subject to First Amendment 
protections.”213 While the trial court held, in issuing the stalking order, 
that Rynearson intended to make Moriwaki feel harassed, intimidated, 
tormented, and embarrassed, the court here held that Rynearson’s speech 
was protected “so long as it does not fall within any of the categories of 
unprotected speech.”214 The court noted that Rynearson’s speech was 
neither obscene nor did it amount to true threats, and thus it would be 
                                                     
205. Id. 




210. Id.  
211. Moriwaki v. Rynearson, No. 17-2-01463-1, 2018 WL 733811, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 
10, 2018). 
212. Id. at *7.  
213. Id. at *8 (referencing State v. Noah, 103 Wash. App. 29, 34–35, 9 P.3d 858, 862 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2000)).  
214. Id. at *8.  
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unreasonable to punish him for otherwise protected, anonymous 
speech.215 The court concluded so despite the fact that neither the plain 
language nor grammatical structure of the statute mandated that 
conclusion; instead, the court cited to a district court case from Maryland 
to support its conclusion.216 
While Rynearson’s challenge to RCW 9.61.260 makes its way 
through the federal courts,217 it is unclear whether such a challenge will 
be successful.218 There has been considerable case law addressing the 
true threats and obscenity aspects of Washington’s cyberstalking 
statute,219 though Mr. Rynearson is the first to challenge the anonymous 
and repeated speech provisions. This Comment will examine the 
constitutionality of the statute’s treatment of anonymous speech and 
advise on what to do going forward to ensure that the legitimate scope of 
the statute is allowed to still exist. 
II. WASHINGTON’S CYBERSTALKING STATUTE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In its attempt to eliminate harassing and intimidating speech targeted 
at women online, RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) unconstitutionally criminalizes 
anonymous speech protected by the First Amendment. Cyberstalking is a 
serious issue that predominately affects women and should be addressed, 
but “the manner of that confrontation cannot consist of selective 
limitations on speech.”220 Because RCW 9.61.260 addresses 
cyberstalking by singling out anonymous speech that might be protected 
by the First Amendment, it is unconstitutional as-applied and is facially 
overbroad and vague.221 RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) threatens to chill online 
                                                     
215. Id. at *10–11. 
216. Id.  
217. Oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals occurred July 12, 2018. See Oral 
Argument, Rynearson v. Ferguson, No. 17-35853, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/ 
view_video.php?pk_vid=0000014043 [https://perma.cc/PWL8-RNPN].  
218. See Rynearson v. Ferguson, No. 17-35853 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2018) (finding that the district 
court improperly abstained from considering Rynearson's constitutional challenge to RCW 9.61.260 
and remanding for further proceedings). 
219. Shimizu, supra note 18, at 120–21. 
220. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (holding that a St. Paul ordinance 
criminalizing certain forms of hate speech was unconstitutionally overbroad because it targeted 
speech on the basis of its content).  
221. Generally, courts will consider whether a particular application of a challenged law should 
be decided first. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1989) (“It is not the usual 
judicial practice, however, nor do we consider it generally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth 
issue unnecessarily-that is, before it is determined that the statute would be valid as applied. Such a 
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anonymous speech. As such, it should either be struck down as 
unconstitutional or courts should narrowly construct the law by requiring 
that the anonymous speech in question also be unprotected before a 
defendant is charged with criminal action. Ultimately, this Comment 
will propose that enacting new legislation redrafting the language of 
RCW 9.61.260 to avoid unconstitutional treatment of anonymous online 
speech is the best solution. 
This Part will proceed as follows. First, section II.A will argue that 
the superior court in Moriwaki v. Rynearson got it right in concluding 
that RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) was unconstitutional as applied to 
Mr. Rynearson and will engage in statutory construction of the 
Washington cyberstalking statute. As discussed in sections I.B.1 and 
I.B.2, anonymous online speech is by default protected by the First 
Amendment; unless and until the speech loses its protected character by 
virtue of its proscribable content, governments cannot constitutionally 
regulate the speech. Next, section II.B will examine the ways in which 
RCW 9.61.260 is facially unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds and 
proposes modeling a legal challenge of RCW 9.61.260 on the successful 
challenge of Illinois’s cyberstalking law. 
A. Moriwaki v. Rynearson as a Case Study: RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) Is 
Unconstitutional As-Applied 
RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) should not and cannot be constitutionally 
applied to Rynearson. His speech about and towards Moriwaki, while 
anonymous and repeated, was not intended as harassment. Speech may 
not be regulated merely because it is anonymous or because a listener 
felt harassed by the speech. This fact has been bolstered by the trial 
court’s decision to vacate the stalking order against Rynearson. Using 
the order issued against Rynearson as a test case, it is possible that 
RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) may be challenged as-applied; this as-applied 
challenge could have facial consequences. This was the case when 
Illinois’s cyberstalking statute was struck down as unconstitutional. If 
the law is unconstitutional as applied to one person’s non-obscene and 
non-threatening anonymous speech, it may be applied unconstitutionally 
to all who speak online in a non-obscene and non-threatening manner. 
                                                     
course would convert use of the overbreadth doctrine from a necessary means of vindicating the 
plaintiff’s own right not to be bound by a statute that is unconstitutional into a means of mounting 
gratuitous wholesale attacks upon state and federal laws. . . . Thus, for reasons relating both to the 
proper functioning of courts and to their efficiency, the lawfulness of the particular application of 
the law should ordinarily be decided first.”).  
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1. Anonymous Speech Must Fall Outside the Scope of the First 
Amendment to Be Grounds for Civil or Criminal Punishment 
While there may be instances in which a person can be 
constitutionally punished on the basis of online speech, the mere fact 
that a person speaks anonymously cannot be the basis for 
criminalization.222 Anonymous speech is the heart of the internet, and 
the fact that some actors may abuse it does not mean that it should be 
banned or punished outright. Anonymous speech that rises to the level of 
harassment, intimidation, “true threats,” or obscenity may be 
criminalized in accordance with the First Amendment, but the 
criminalization of such speech hinges not on the anonymous nature of 
the speaker but on the unprotected status of their speech.223 
The structure of RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) singles out anonymous speech 
among other types of speech without positioning it within any of the 
categories of speech unprotected by the First Amendment. In contrast 
with subsections (a) and (c), which, on their own, are generally not 
protected under the First Amendment, anonymous speech is protected 
under the First Amendment. Connecting subsection (b) with the intent 
clause of the statute partially corrects this problem, but not entirely. The 
statute begins by listing different levels of intent that can justify the 
entry of a stalking protection order on the basis of anonymous speech—
“intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass.”224 However, 
assuming arguendo that all forms of intent enumerated are constitutional, 
the handful of people who have challenged their punishment under the 
law argue that they did not, in fact, possess the requisite intent to be 
punished. 
In Mr. Rynearson’s case, the trial court entered an order against him 
despite his assertions that he did not intend to harass or intimidate Mr. 
Moriwaki.225 The superior court, on review, ultimately reversed the 
order because, despite Mr. Moriwaki’s contention that he felt harassed 
and intimidated, Mr. Rynearson himself lacked the requisite intent to 
commit the crime of cyberstalking.226 This shows that the law can, and 
has been, applied in such a way as to take the focus off the alleged 
                                                     
222. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). 
223. See infra section II.C.  
224. WASH. Rev. CODE § 9.61.260(1) (2018). 
225. A full detailing of the posts and events that transpired between Mr. Rynearson and Mr. 
Moriwaki are available at Moriwaki v. Rynearson, No. 17-2-01463-1, 2018 WL 733811, at *2–5 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2018).  
226. Id. at *10. 
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cyberstalker and place it instead on the victim. Those who engage in 
anonymous speech do not necessarily do so because they wish to harass 
the targets of their speech. A person who does not intend to harass the 
target of their speech should not be punished solely based on the 
anonymous nature of their speech. Despite the language in the statute 
requiring courts to look at the intent of the alleged stalker, courts have 
and will likely continue to focus on the effect of the speech on the victim 
in such a way that is ultimately unconstitutional. 
2. Anonymous Speech Is Not Inherently Threatening Speech 
Washington has fallen into a logical trap when it comes to anonymous 
speech; intent to harass is assumed because of the speaker’s anonymous 
status. It is almost as if enforcement agencies presume that, because one 
speaks anonymously, that person could not possibly have anything to 
say that is worthy of protection under the First Amendment. This could 
not be further from the truth. If the logic used by the trial court in 
Moriwaki is any indicator, Washington courts instead look at the 
feelings of the target, rather than the intent of the speaker, in determining 
whether to punish a speaker under RCW 9.61.260(1)(b). Unless it can be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the speaker actually intended to 
harass another person through anonymous speech, they may not and 
should not be punished based on that anonymous speech. A speaker’s 
right to anonymous speech is no less real just because that speech occurs 
online. 
As a matter of basic statutory construction and interpretation, 
RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) targets anonymous speech without connecting it to 
speech which is necessarily outside the scope of the First Amendment. 
While the statute does require that the alleged cyberstalker have a certain 
level of intent in order to be found culpable, courts have found a person 
to be liable despite the lack of such intent. Furthermore, as discussed in 
section I.C, there is no categorical exception to the First Amendment for 
harassing speech.227 Unless and until the harassing speech reaches the 
level of content proscribable under the First Amendment, there is no 
basis for regulating the speech.228 
Assuming that the anonymous speech was not said with the required 
intent, there is no constitutional basis for criminalizing the speech in the 
first place. Critically, the legislature drafted the statute disjunctively, 
                                                     
227. See supra notes 119–38. 
228. Id. 
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rather than conjunctively.229 The statute recognizes obscenity or 
anonymity or true threats, if said with the intent to harass, intimidate, 
torment, or embarrass, as equally valid avenues of committing the crime 
of cyberstalking.230 Based on the structure of the statute, it is not 
required by statute that anonymous speech also be obscene or constitutes 
true threats in order for it to be the basis of a stalking protection order.231 
While the superior court in Moriwaki v. Rynearson based its reasoning 
off such a connection in addition to its determination that Mr. Rynearson 
did not have the requisite intent, its conclusion was not mandated or 
even suggested by statutory language.232 
There are instances in which anonymous speech should be punished. 
Where anonymous speech is harassing or intimidating, obscene, or a true 
threat, state governments can and should use their power to ensure that 
innocent people are protected from the physical, psychological, and 
economic harms caused by cyberstalking. However, where the 
underlying speech is protected by the First Amendment, and especially 
when it constitutes political speech, states must not criminalize those 
who express themselves anonymously. 
B. RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) Is Facially Unconstitutional 
If RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) cannot be struck down through an as-applied 
challenge with facial consequences, those seeking to preserve 
anonymous online speech should turn to the overbreadth doctrine. 
RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it has the 
potential to punish otherwise protected anonymous speech and threatens 
to chill speech. Similarly, RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) is unconstitutionally 
vague because it fails to provide people with adequate notice with 
sufficient specificity that their conduct is unlawful. 
1. The Requisite Intent Under RCW 9.61.260 Is Overbroad and 
Facially Unconstitutional 
RCW 9.61.260 makes a person guilty of cyberstalking if they engage 
in electronic communications with the intent to “harass, intimidate, 
torment, or embarrass.”233 While the “harass” and “intimidate” intent 
                                                     
229. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.260(1) (2018). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at *11–12. 
233. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.260(1) (2018). 
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levels are likely constitutional if the statute is not found to have failed at 
the strict scrutiny level of review, the “torment” or “embarrass” prongs 
are problematic.234 
The use of the word “torment” within the context of cyberstalking 
renders RCW 9.61.260 substantially overly broad. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines “torment” as “a state of great suffering, bodily or 
mental.”235 However, the Oxford English Dictionary also defines 
“torment” as “an instrument of irritation or annoyance.”236 While both 
definitions are correct, it is unclear which meaning the Washington 
legislature intended, as the word is not defined within the statute or in 
surrounding statutes. The word “torment” is often used colloquially to 
mean something far less than suffering or torture. Indeed, the most 
common usage that comes to mind is when an exasperated parent tells 
their child to “stop tormenting your sister/brother/the dog/the cat.” While 
the legislature would have been within its power to regulate speech that 
reaches the level of causing torture, it cannot reach the more colloquial 
usage of “torment” without wiping out speech that is protected under the 
First Amendment. The fact that reasonable minds can disagree further 
demonstrates that the use of the word “torment” within the context of 
RCW 9.61.260 is overbroad—there likely are constitutional applications 
of the statute to target tormenting, as in torturous anonymous speech, but 
the risk of tormenting, as in annoying anonymous speech getting swept 
up is too high. While the First Amendment does not prohibit laws that 
target speech that is tormenting in the context of telephone 
harassment,237 the use of the word in that context is based on the manner 
of the communication, not its contents. In that context, the word 
“torment” is used to regulate incessant phone calls late at night, rather 
than the content of those phone calls. The use of the word “torment” in 
connection with cyberstalking could, therefore, unconstitutionally cover 
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. 
Similarly, the use of the word “embarrass” renders RCW 9.61.260 
facially unconstitutional because there is no foreseeable constitutional 
application of the law on the basis of embarrassing anonymous speech. 
                                                     
234. Id.  
235. Torment, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/203557?rskey=twaPmL&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid 
[https://perma.cc/UAQ3-RC9A].    
236. Id. 
237. State v. Alphonse, 142 Wash. App. 417, 174 P.3d 684 (2008) (finding that the purpose of 
Washington’s telephone harassment statute was to protect residents from fear and abuse of persons 
who intend to “torment” them by use of the telephone and from the intrusion of unwanted telephone 
calls).  
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held repeatedly that “‘[s]peech does not 
lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass 
others.’”238 And Washington courts have recognized that a stalking 
protection order cannot be issued “to penalize people who are 
overbearing, obnoxious, or rude.”239 A literal interpretation of the word 
“embarrass” in the statute could lead to absurd conclusions. Imagine, for 
example, a person who shares a naked childhood photo of their sibling, 
ostensibly to embarrass them on their birthday. In this age of constant 
internet access and social media, strangers post things about people 
around them that could very well be embarrassing to the subject.240 
Would these examples fall within the scope of embarrassing obscene 
communications that amount to cyberstalking? Washington courts have 
already recognized in dicta that the use of the word “embarrass” in the 
statute is likely constitutionally problematic, though they have yet to 
officially answer the question. In State v. Stanley,241 the Washington 
Court of Appeals held, in a challenge to RCW 9.61.260, that although it 
was suspicious of the “embarrass” prong of the intent requirement, “[i]n 
view of the limited briefing, [it would] not decide whether the intent to 
embarrass in the cyberstalking statute renders the statute 
unconstitutionally overbroad.”242 
2. The Failure to Connect Anonymous Speech to Unprotected Speech 
Renders RCW 9.61.260 Overbroad 
Regardless of the value of allegedly harassing speech, 
RCW 9.61.260(1)(b)—in its current form—is inherently overbroad 
because it does not cabin its application to anonymous speech which is 
also threatening or lewd; it hinges on the fact that the speech is 
anonymous or repeated rather than focusing on speech which is already 
                                                     
238. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982)).  
239. Burchell v. Thibault, 74 Wash. App. 517, 522, 874 P.2d 196, 199 (1994).  
240. In July 2018, a woman chronicled the conversations and interactions between two strangers 
on a plane that she switched seats with, including insinuations that the two engaged in sexual 
activity while on the plane. While one of the subjects has embraced the publicity, the other has not, 
especially after her Instagram account was found. While this is certainly an invasion of both 
subjects’ privacy and was embarrassing for at least one party involved, it is not, and should not, be 
considered cyberstalking. Under the language in the statute, however, it very well could. See, e.g., 
Mary Elizabeth Williams, That Viral ‘Strangers on a Plane’ Twitter Story: Not a Rom-Com but a 
Horror Show, SALON (July 6, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/07/06/that-viral-strangers-on-a-
plane-twitter-story-not-a-rom-com-but-a-horror-show/ [https://perma.cc/4RYD-BF56].  
241. No. 74204–3–I, 2017 WL 3868480 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017). 
242. Id. at *9. 
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unprotected. The First Amendment does not prohibit harassing or 
intimidating speech until its nonspeech elements make it ineligible for 
protection under the First Amendment.243 And while the intent 
requirement would likely render some applications of the statute 
constitutional, like where the speech arises to the level of criminal 
harassment or intimidation, such speech is likely much less frequent than 
speech which is embarrassing or tormenting, as that term is commonly 
used. States undoubtedly have compelling interests in preventing and 
punishing harassment, though states may not regulate harassment in a 
manner that infringes on protected speech. As it currently stands, 
RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) simply covers more speech than is constitutionally 
permissible. The internet is the quintessential twenty-first century 
example of a public forum. Speech that is protected by the First 
Amendment must be allowed to flourish online, even if some might find 
it objectionable. 
Though RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) has not yet been enforced on a wide 
scale, it threatens to chill speech as speakers may choose to not speak at 
all lest they be punished for speaking anonymously.244 The language of 
the statute may focus on the intent of the speaker, but this is not how 
victims and prosecutors have used the statute with regard to anonymous 
speakers.245 And as discussed above, the use of the words “torment” and 
“embarrass” makes RCW 9.61.260 extremely prone to use against 
protected speech. While those terms could be constitutionally used to 
prohibit the dissemination of revenge pornography or true threats,246 to 
                                                     
243. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (finding that a city 
ordinance that criminalized speech said with the intent to intimidate on the basis of race was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment). But see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2004) 
(finding that a state law that banned cross burning was constitutional because the law focused on the 
nonspeech elements of cross burning). 
244. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468 (2007) 
(discussing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s regulation of campaign commercials); id. (“Far 
from serving the values the First Amendment is meant to protect, an intent-based test would chill 
core political speech by opening the door to a trial on every ad within the terms of § 203, on the 
theory that the speaker actually intended to affect an election, no matter how compelling the 
indications that the ad concerned a pending legislative or policy issue. No reasonable speaker would 
choose to run an ad covered by BCRA if its only defense to a criminal prosecution would be that its 
motives were pure.”). 
245. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, if there is no mens rea stated in a federal criminal 
law, courts should read in a specific intent. See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 
2001, 2003 (2015) (overturning defendant’s conviction for threatening interstate communications 
because he did not intend to threaten his victims). 
246. State v. Kohonen, 192 Wash. App. 567, 370 P.3d 16 (2016) (finding that a teenager’s tweet 
did not constitute a “true threat”, and therefore could not be the basis of punishment under 
RCW 9.61.260).  
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criminalize tormenting or embarrassing anonymous speech would be 
facially invalid.247 
Further, the structure of the statute suggests that it could be used to 
punish speech that would ordinarily be protected to the highest degree, 
such as speech to boycott a local business for failing to engage in ethical 
practices or speech organizing a protest. Because the grammatical 
structure of the statute is disjunctive rather than conjunctive, anonymous 
speech can be the grounds of a cyberstalking action on its own, without 
reference to otherwise unprotected areas of speech like true threats or 
obscenity. While the court in Moriwaki decided to strike down the 
stalking protection order in that case because the order punished 
constitutionally protected political speech, the court was in no way 
required to do so. Courts should not and are not required to rewrite laws 
when legislatures are sloppy in their drafting. By interpreting 
RCW 9.61.260 to require a conjunctive element—that is, to be obscene 
or true threats and anonymous—to target anonymous online speech in 
line with United States v. Cassidy,248 it was not required to do so. 
3. Illinois’s Striking of Its Cyberstalking Statute Should be Used as a 
Model for Attempts to Strike RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) 
Washington courts should look to the Supreme Court of Illinois’s 
example when evaluating its cyberstalking statute. Illinois’s now-
unconstitutional cyberstalking statute, which the Supreme Court of 
Illinois struck down on overbreadth grounds, was substantially similar to 
Washington’s. Like Illinois’s cyberstalking statute, Washington’s 
cyberstalking statute has the potential to penalize otherwise protected 
anonymous speech. 
Illinois’s cyberstalking statute was struck down because it did not 
require that cyberstalking behaviors also constitute true threats or speech 
integral to criminal conduct.249 By its terms, the statute focused on 
whether a defendant’s speech would cause a reasonable person to fear 
for their safety or to suffer emotional distress.250 While this differs from 
the standard in the text of the Washington cyberstalking statute—which 
focuses on the speaker’s specific intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or 
                                                     
247. See, e.g., People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (striking down Illinois law that prohibited 
online speech that would knowingly cause embarrassment or emotional distress on First 
Amendment grounds). 
248. 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011). 
249. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶¶ 22–30. 
250. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.55(a)(1), (a)(2) (2018). 
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embarrass—when applied, these intent requirements are not significantly 
different. The Illinois’s statute’s focus on emotional distress makes the 
commission of a tort a criminal offense251; the “embarrass” and 
“torment” prongs of the Washington statute are substantially similar to 
this. A person who reasonably fears for their safety as a result of 
someone else’s speech likely does so because the speaker intended it to 
have such an effect. The converse is also true; a person who intends to 
harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass the target of their speech will 
cause that target to feel fear or suffer emotional distress. 
Furthermore, neither the now-defunct Illinois cyberstalking statute 
nor the current Washington cyberstalking statute limited their respective 
applications to regulating speech that is unprotected by the First 
Amendment. This shortcoming was clearly recognized by the Supreme 
Court of Illinois in Releford252 and by the superior court in Moriwaki.253 
By their terms, each statute respectively focused on the content of 
speech that was considered emotionally distressing or harassing, 
intimidating, tormenting, or embarrassing. While there are certainly 
applications of the statutes in constitutional manners, that is, regulating 
speech unprotected by the First Amendment, the fact that cases like 
Releford and Moriwaki arose in their first place are indications that the 
overbroad terms in the laws are vulnerable to unconstitutional 
applications. The Supreme Court of Illinois in Releford essentially 
concluded that the law was not only unconstitutional as applied to 
Mr. Releford, but also that it was facially unconstitutional because it 
attempted to regulate constitutionally protected speech in its attempt to 
criminalize unprotected speech.254 The same is true of RCW 9.61.260, 
and Washington courts should recognize that. 
C. RCW § 9.61.260(1)(b) Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny 
In order to withstand strict scrutiny, RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) must be 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.255 Strict scrutiny is 
an extremely high bar; “nearly all laws fail strict scrutiny” review when 
it applies.256 “A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict 
                                                     
251. Id.  
252. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 78. 
253. Moriwaki v. Rynearson, No. 17-2-01463-1, 2018 WL 733811, at *11–14 (Wash. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 10, 2018).  
254. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶¶ 57–69. 
255. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000).  
256. John B. Major, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A First Amendment 
Analysis of 18 U.S.C. Sec 2261 A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 152 (2012). 
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scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral 
justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the 
regulated speech.”257 RCW 9.61.260 is content-discriminatory on its face 
and, as an effect of the ambiguous meaning of its language and its 
grammatical structure, targets speech that is both protected and 
unprotected by the First Amendment. 
In order to survive judicial review, RCW 9.61.260 must serve a 
compelling state interest. Representatives from the Washington 
Coalition of Sexual Assault testified before the State House of 
Representatives that “[c]yberstalking is an expression of an old crime: 
violence against women.”258 Further testimony shows that proponents of 
the bill intended it as “[a] message . . . sent to cyberstalkers that society 
will not tolerate their behavior. They must know that they will be caught, 
prosecuted, and punished.”259 As discussed in Part I, women 
predominately feel the harms of cyberstalking; one in six women will be 
victims of some form of cyberstalking during her life, compared with 
one in nineteen men.260 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized that states have a compelling interest to protect their citizens, 
without regard to gender, from harassment as part of their police 
power.261 
Assuming, arguendo, that preventing violence against and the 
harassment of women is a compelling state interest,262 
RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 
The statute fails because there are less restrictive means to achieve this 
                                                     
257. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (quoting Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)).  
258. S. COMM. ON TECH. AND COMMC’N., H.B. REPORT 2711, S. 85, 2nd Sess., at 2 (Wash. 
2004). 
259. Id.  
260. National Data on Intimate Partner Violence, Sexual Violence, and Stalking, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL (2014), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs-fact-
sheet-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JFD-5ZUB].  
261. Cf. City of Bellevue v. Lorang, 140 Wash. 2d 19, 27–28, 992 P.2d 496, 500–01 (2000) 
(collecting cases where the Court analyzed Washington’s telephone harassment statute and 
concluded the state could exercise its police powers to prevent harassment); Sheehan v. Gregoire, 
272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1146–47 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“The government can assert no compelling 
interest in suppressing speech based on the content of that speech ‘when the speaker intends to 
communicate[,] but permitting the same speech if incidental to another activity.’ That is, the 
government cannot claim any such [compelling] interest is served by focusing solely on the intent of 
the speaker.” (citations omitted)).  
262. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly held that preventing violence and 
harassment against women is a compelling state interest, there is at least one district court decision 
that so held with regards to the federal cyberstalking law. See United States v. Matusiewicz, 84 F. 
Supp. 3d 363 (D. Del. 2015).  
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goal without criminalizing potentially-protected anonymous speech. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held repeatedly that less restrictive means of 
regulating online speech, like installation of filtering software on public 
computers, are more constitutionally sound ways to regulate speech.263 
While there may be valid reasons for enacting laws that signal harassing 
speech will not be tolerated,264 this is not the least restrictive way of 
doing so. For example, many states have civil tort liability regimes that 
allow victims of abusive speech to seek compensation by bringing 
intentional infliction of mental distress claims against the speaker.265 
While tort liability is not a perfect solution for victims, it is one avenue 
for relief that does not necessarily implicate content-based government 
regulation of speech. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court said in R.A.V., “the reason why fighting 
words are categorically excluded from the protection of the First 
Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea, 
but that their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially 
unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to 
convey.”266 RCW 9.61.260 is not narrowly tailored because it targets 
communications that are protected by the First Amendment. Rather than 
targeting the mode of socially objectionable behavior, RCW 9.61.260 
looks to the content of the anonymous speech and decides, regardless of 
whether the content is protected, that certain speech should be penalized. 
Even if RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) is only applied when the speaker intends 
the anonymous speech to harass, intimidate, or torment, the law on its 
face distinguishes between favored and disfavored speech by favoring 
speech which is not anonymous—this is impermissible. While the U.S. 
Supreme Court has asserted that viewpoint discrimination was proper in 
some circumstances, this is not one of those circumstances. Anonymous 
                                                     
263. John B. Major, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 
153 (2012). In Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), and Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2005), the 
Court held that portions of the CDA and COPA, respectively, were unconstitutional because there 
were less restrictive and more narrowly tailored means available to achieve the government’s goal 
of protecting children from obscene online content.  
264. See generally Aily Shimizu, Domestic Violence in the Digital Age: Towards the Creation of 
a Comprehensive Cyberstalking Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 116 (2013). 
265. See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011) (plaintiff brought suit against the 
Westboro Baptist Church for intentional infliction of mental distress for protesting his son’s military 
funeral; however, the Court held that the Church had a free speech right to speak on “issues of 
public import” including homosexuality and the U.S. armed forces). Contra Brekke v. Wills, 23 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 609 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (a teenager’s speech constituted harassment and infliction of 
emotional distress when directed at his girlfriend’s mother, justifying the grant of an injunction 
against the teen).  
266. 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992) (emphasis omitted).  
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speech that is harassing or intimidating may be prohibited. Here, 
however, the law sweeps up constitutionally protected anonymous 
speech in its attempt to prohibit harassment and intimidation. The very 
fact that the law allows for culpability when the anonymous speech is 
made with the intent to torment and embarrass signals that the law is not 
narrowly tailored. Thus, under the standards set by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, RCW 9.61.260 cannot survive strict scrutiny. 
III. THE WASHINGTION COURTS AND LEGISLATURE MUST 
ACT TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM CYBERSTALKING AND 
RESPECT THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF ONLINE 
SPEAKERS 
Washington has two avenues to address the problems posed by 
RCW 9.61.260. While the courts could narrowly construct the statute so 
as to avoid the constitutional question, such a construction is not 
commanded by the language or structure of the statute. Thus, the 
Washington legislature should redraft the statute. This Comment 
proposes a revised version of RCW 9.61.260 that is more likely to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
A. Judicial Solutions 
RCW 9.61.260 does not contain a severability clause, nor does it 
contain explicit language allowing a court to strike down 
unconstitutional parts of the law while upholding its constitutional 
provisions. However, there are potential avenues that Washington courts 
could take to ensure the legitimate scope of RCW 9.61.260 stands. 
To ensure that the cyberstalking statute is upheld, Washington courts 
should cabin its application to contexts in which the challenged speech is 
not constitutionally protected. Courts should attempt to find a limiting 
construction of RCW 9.61.260(1)(b). The other two provisions of 
9.61.260(1) criminalize speech already unprotected by the First 
Amendment—obscenity and true threats. States can criminalize speech 
that is anonymous without running afoul of the First Amendment as long 
as the speech is also obscene or a true threat and is said with the intent to 
harass, torment, intimidate, or embarrass. While courts are usually not 
willing to rewrite law for the legislature,267 they might do so in order to 
preserve the legitimate sweep of the larger cyberstalking statute. 
                                                     
267. See, e.g., Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (“It has long been a 
tenant of First Amendment law that in determining a facial challenge to a statute, if it be ‘readily 
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At least one Washington court has already embraced a limiting 
construction of RCW 9.61.260. This is evidenced by the trial court’s 
language reversing and vacating the stalking order against 
Mr. Rynearson. The court relied on language of a District Court of 
Maryland case,268 United States v. Cassidy,269 in which the court held 
“even though numerous court decisions have made a point to protect 
anonymous, uncomfortable speech and extend that protection to the 
Internet [sic], not all speech is protected speech.”270 The court further 
elaborated that “[t]here are certain ‘well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech’ that remain unprotected by the First Amendment,” but 
noted that speech is otherwise protected.271 As the trial court there 
recognized “[t]here was no obscenity by words or conduct. There is no 
evidence [of] incitement or speech integral to criminal conduct.”272 In so 
doing, the superior court adopted a conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, 
reading of RCW 9.61.260. Although this reading of RCW 9.61.260 is 
more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny, it is not faithful to the 
statute’s language. As one court held, “[a] stalking protection order is 
not an available remedy if the speech and conduct complained of is 
protected under the First Amendment. The communication and conduct 
in this case falls under the umbrella of constitutionally protected 
speech.”273 While courts are generally wary of rewriting laws, it seems 
that Washington courts have not hesitated to redraft legislation when it 
comes to ensuring that RCW 9.61.260 remains in full effect. 
If there is no plausible limiting construction, Washington courts 
should strike down RCW 9.61.260 as unconstitutionally infringing on 
the right to free speech. A speaker’s right to anonymous speech is no 
less protected because they speak online. While courts view facial 
invalidation as “strong medicine,”274 and are therefore unlikely to strike 
down RCW 9.61.260, a Washington court could easily determine there 
is no valid application of RCW 9.61.260(1)(b). Washington courts 
                                                     
susceptible’ to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional, it will be upheld. The key 
to the application of this principle is that the statute must be ‘readily susceptible’ to the limitation; 
we will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional standards.” (citations omitted)). 
268. Moriwaki v. Rynearson, No. 17-2-01463-1, 2018 WL 733811, at *10 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 
10, 2018). 
269. 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).  
270. Id. at 581–82. 
271. Moriwaki, at *10 (quoting United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582–83 (D. Md. 
2011)). 
272. Id. at *11.  
273. Id. at *12. 
274. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).  
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should follow Illinois and strike down the overbroad law as 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.275 The Illinois court held 
that, while the state may regulate speech that is not constitutionally 
protected, the cyberstalking statute did not limit itself to such an 
application.276 
The Illinois case is very similar to the situation facing Washington 
courts and should serve as guidance to Washington courts to strike down 
RCW 9.61.260. Courts should not do the legislature’s job and make the 
law conform to the Constitution. While the courts are within their rights 
to follow the lead of the Moriwaki trial court and the Cassidy district 
court, they are not obligated to interpret RCW 9.61.260 beyond the plain 
language of the law. 
B. Legislative Solutions 
The Washington legislature should amend RCW 9.61.260 to ensure 
that the legitimate needs of victims of stalking receive the protection 
they need. As discussed above, the shortcomings in the current version 
of RCW 9.61.260 fails to do this. The legislature should take several 
steps to remedy the First Amendment issues implicated by the current 
version of the statute and provide a solution for a legitimate problem. 
 First, the intent elements of “torment” and “embarrass” should 
either be defined within the statute itself or removed altogether. The 
common usage of the term “torment” could render the current version of 
RCW 9.61.260 overbroad because it does not limit its application to 
speech which is torturing as opposed to merely annoying. The word 
“torment,” if kept in the new version of the statute, must be defined to 
specifically cabin the statute’s application to cyberstalking activities that 
are torturous. The word “embarrass” should be removed from the statute 
entirely. Embarrassing speech is protected by the First Amendment until 
it crosses over into the realm of speech that is not protected or action that 
can be regulated by the state.277 Based on the now-overturned Illinois 
                                                     
275. People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶¶ 24–34.  
276. Id. ¶¶ 50–61. 
277.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 457 (2011) (speech accusing plaintiff’s dead son 
of being a pedophile because he was a service member and a Catholic was protected speech); Boos 
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (District of Columbia provision that prohibited political 
picketing outside diplomatic embassies was unconstitutional); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (satirical advertisement insinuating that plaintiff Falwell engaged in incest 
was protected); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (advertisement accusing city 
commissioner of conspiring against integration efforts did not constitute libel and, without evidence 
of actual malice, was protected).  
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statute, which focused on emotional distress, the fact that speech might 
be embarrassing or cause emotional distress might not on its own be 
enough to pass strict scrutiny. The State of Washington can legitimately 
regulate and criminalize speech that is harassing and intimidating, 
assuming that the elements of the crime are themselves constitutional. 
Second, the Washington legislature should make the provision of 
RCW 9.61.260 dealing with anonymous speech specifically conjunctive 
rather than disjunctive. The statute should be rewritten as: 
 
A person is guilty of cyberstalking if he or she, with intent to 
harass, intimidate or torment, as defined in RCW X.XX.XXX, 
or embarrass any other person, and under circumstances not 
constituting telephone harassment, makes an electronic 
communication to such other person or a third party:  
 
(a) Using any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or obscene 
words, images, or language, or suggesting the 
commission of any lewd or lascivious act; OR 
(b) Anonymously or repeatedly whether or not 
conversation occurs; or 
(c) Threatening to inflict injury on the person or property 
of the person called or any member of his or her family 
or household; OR278 
(c) anonymously or repeatedly contacts a person: 
(i) using any obscene words, images, or language or 
suggesting the commission of any lewd or 
lascivious acts; OR 
(ii) threatening to inflict injury on the person or 
property of the person called or any member of 
his or her family or household.279 
 
Making these changes will likely render RCW 9.61.260 
constitutional. First, by explicitly connecting the anonymous speech 
component to speech that is not protected by the First Amendment—
                                                     
278. WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.61.260 (2018) (emphasis added).  
279. To clarify the changes I propose to RCW 9.61.260: Deleting the word “embarrass” and 
defining torment cures a significant portion of the statute’s overbreadth. Ideally, in section (a), the 
Legislature would limit the provision only to obscene words, images, or language to conform with 
the Supreme Court’s standards in Miller v. California. I flipped (b) and (c) to make the statute more 
clear and easier to read. I added provisions (c)(i) and (c)(ii) to further demonstrate that the 
anonymity provision of the statute must operate within constitutional constraints.  
(cb)  
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obscene speech and true threats—the anonymous speech element is no 
longer vulnerable to unpopular, but constitutionally protected, speech. 
Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that RCW 9.61.260 and the 
issuance of a stalking protection order is the most narrowly tailored way 
to regulate cyberstalking speech, this change would also likely make the 
statute survive strict scrutiny analysis. There is a compelling state 
interest in protecting people from cyberstalking; by connecting the 
anonymity element to types of unprotected speech, the statute is 
narrowly tailored to serve this goal. 
The legislature should also add a clause limiting application of the 
statute to speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment. The 
legislature did so in drafting Washington’s unlawful harassment law, and 
this language can be copied verbatim and added to the cyberstalking 
statute.280 Enforcement of the unlawful harassment statute is limited to a 
“course of conduct” that amounts to harassment “but does not include 
constitutionally protected free speech.”281 Adding this provision is a 
simple way to ensure that the statute not be enforced in such a way that 
violates the First Amendment and provides courts with an easy way to 
justify overturning an unconstitutional stalking protection order. Thus, 
the revised version of the statute would include a subsection that would 
prevent the application of RCW 9.61.260 in a way that violates the First 
Amendment. 
The legislature should also add a severability clause to ensure that 
courts can selectively strike unconstitutional provisions without 
invalidating it as a whole. While severability clauses will not protect a 
statute from all constitutional attacks,282 courts may utilize them to strike 
down only portions of a statute, as opposed to the entire statute.283 When 
a statute contains a severability clause, “the normal rule that partial, 
rather than facial, invalidation is the required course.”284 The addition of 
a severability clause would help ensure that the constitutional provisions 
                                                     
280. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.92.020(3)(c), 9A.46.110(6)(c). 
281. Id. § 10.14.020(1).  
282. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922) (refusing to sever a federal statute because the 
unconstitutional provision was so “interwoven” with the constitutional provisions that the Court 
would have had to rewrite the law so it could stand).  
283. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 (1985) (finding that Washington’s 
“moral nuisance” statute was only partially invalid as being unconstitutionally overbroad, due in 
part to the legislature’s inclusion of a severability clause); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
883 (1997) (saving the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act from a facial 
overbreadth challenge by severing the term “or indecent” form the statute pursuant to its 
severability clause).  
284. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504.  
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of the statute can stand, while the unconstitutional provisions are rightly 
stripped away. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Laws governing harassing speech and conduct must catch up with the 
realities of the twenty-first century. Cyberstalking statutes are necessary 
to address the threats and harassment people, and women in particular, 
face online. These threats are no less serious simply because they occur 
on the internet. The nature of the internet can make the cyberstalker 
seem both omnipotent and omnipresent. However, these laws must not 
infringe on internet users’ right to free speech any more than is 
necessary. 
RCW 9.61.260 impermissibly infringes on the right of online users to 
speak anonymously. The First Amendment is not void because a person 
chooses to speak online, and an anonymous speaker should not be 
punished simply because they choose to be anonymous. Because the 
structure of RCW 9.61.260 allows for criminal and civil enforcement 
actions targeting constitutionally protected speech, the law needs to be 
reconsidered. While the state generally has a compelling interest in 
protecting its citizens from harassment, it may not do so at the expense 
of constitutionally protected speech. RCW 9.61.260 has the potential to 
chill online anonymous speech, and as such should be amended so that 
constitutionally protected speech is not swept under its reach. 
Washington is home to leaders and innovators in the technology 
world, and its laws should reflect the sophistication of its homegrown 
industry. Washington courts have two choices: re-interpret 
RCW 9.61.260 to require a connection between anonymity and 
unprotected speech, or strike down the statute altogether. Ideally, the 
Washington legislature will take heed of the issues this law presents; this 
Comment does not suggest that cyberstalking laws as a category should 
be struck down. On the contrary, such laws must exist to ensure that all 
speakers, women included, feel safe to speak and exist online. 
Whichever route Washington takes, cyberstalking is a serious issue that 
deserves a serious law to protect the women who so often deal with its 
harms. 
